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Abstract—IC Counterfeiting is becoming serious issue. The
approach discussed here is to use Electromagnetic (EM) input
to an IC and measure its EM input output response. The idea
is to extract a signature from EM response which should be
unique to one IC. The main purpose of this work is to show
that it is possible to authenticate electronic chips from a non-
intrusive method, based on the use of RF waves. IC authentication
can be performed using Physical Unclonable Function (PUF).
PUF are based on process variation inherent to semiconductor
fabrication process. EM based authentication is also based on
the same principle. Nevertheless, unlike PUF such a method does
not need dedicated circuitry and thus may have lower cost of
implementation and may be easier to industrialize. This work first
focuses on FPGA which are a common target of counterfeiting.
We first prove that FPGAs are sensitive to EM excitations and
find the optimum configuration using a lightweight marker not
as complex as PUF to optimize the sensitivity to EM excitation.
Finally, a post processing is performed on the EM measurement
to get the FPGA signature which is later used for authentication.
The post-processing operations are being developed in order to
deal with aging effects and other measurements issues commonly
seen with RF measurement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Trust in Integrated Circuits (IC) is very important since
ICs are the root of the system trust. But in recent years there
has been growing number of incidents related to the trust
of IC. These trust issues related to the ICs have become a
source of major concern in different application areas like
telecommunication, medical, space, military and banking [1].
The malicious or fake ICs can cause permanent or temporary
damage to the hardware platform reducing the reliability of
the system. In [1] Guin et al. discussed how the counterfeit is
becoming the biggest challenge for the semiconductor industry.
The ICs are used in different application ranging from small
industry, household products to the defense, banking and space
exploration applications.
Many methods have been developed to detect and avoid
the counterfeit of IC. Based on the process variation the most
known and commonly used method is Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) method. It exploits the inherent variability of
IC for the purpose of authentication [2]. From [3]-[4], the pro-
cess variation is an inherent variability which comes during the
manufacturing process of the integrated circuits. As the scale of
technology in the CMOS era is going down (less than 100nm)
the variability in the physics of the devices such as transistor
and other elements are getting more pronounced. This process
variation during the manufacturing process comes due to much
reason like random dopant fluctuations (RDF), variations in the
critical dimensions during lithography, variation in the gate
oxide thickness etc. Intrinsic variability of an IC due to the
manufacturing defects can be exploited and use to create a
fingerprint for the IC, which could be used for the purpose of
the authentication.
Our idea is to use electromagnetic (EM) based technique
wherein a guided RF wave interacts with the physics of IC, the
response of the interaction could be used to create a unique
identifier for that IC which could be used for the authentication
purpose. Each IC has its own unique parameters. No two ICs
even built on the mask have same physical characteristics. This
differentiation comes due to the manufacturing variations.
II. GUIDED RF APPROACH FOR IC AUTHENTICATION
Radio Frequency (RF) is any electromagnetic wave whose
frequencies extend from 3 kHz to 300 GHz. The guided RF
wave utilizes the manufacturing variation features. Each IC
interacts with RF input wave and produce a unique signature.
Each response can be stored in a database and when required
it can be used to authenticate an IC.
The guided wave traverse in the IC, a part of it reflects
back and some part is absorbed or refracted. Based on the
physical variations in the IC, amount of reflections, refractions
and absorption differs. This difference gives each IC a unique
identification. In the ICs, the amount of reflection, absorption
or refraction of the input wave depend on the process varia-
tions. The process variation like lithographic defects, variation
in gate oxide thickness etc. causes a variability in the physics
of ICs even from the same mask. This results in a different
and unique response for each IC when a guided RF wave
interacts with it. This could be further utilized for the purpose
of authentication.
The chip could also be interrogated using the plane waves
(radar approach) but we chose to use guided waves. Guided
wave is more effective in the way the amount of the power
injected would be much higher than the plane wave approach.
There is higher probability of loss of power when using
plane wave. In radar approach the waves may interfere with
the environmental noise, or it may disperse from the surface
(package) of IC and not get inside the chip at all.
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III. MEASUREMENT OBJECTIVES, POST-PROCESSING
AND METHODOLOGY
The objective of measurement using guided RF wave is to
measure as much of data when ICs interact with guided RF
wave in order to highlight the differences which could be used
as a signature. Some key measurement objectives are:
1) Excite the IC (in ON state) with a guided RF signal.
2) Measure the amount of transmission and reflection (S-
Parameters) of the RF wave due to interaction with
the IC.
3) Measure other non-linear effects coming due to the
interaction of IC with RF.
4) Measure the amount of internal coupling in the IC.
After the measurement steps, the S-Parameters would be
subjected to post-processing. The post-processing (Correlation,
Cosine-Similarity etc.) of the data would be instrumental in
getting unique response for each IC. The data obtained after the
post-processing of the response could be stored in a database
for future uses. We propose the following methodology, for
the authentication purpose after the post-processing of results
1) Database of S-Parameter can be made for an IC of
say for example ’x123’ series (from a vendor A) after
its manufacturing.
2) Same IC could be tested with same RF signal input
during the course of its lifetime to see the correlation
of the results over the course of time.
3) Another IC (’x123’) from the same vendor with exact
same technology, configuration and manufacturing
mask (as in step i) is excited with same RF signal.
4) Values of S-Parameter are obtained of the IC (de-
scribed in step (iii)), and this value is compared with
the first IC value (described in step (i)).
5) Necessary post processing can be done and then it can
be seen how unique are the two values, of same ICs
of exact same configuration, technology and vendor.
IV. MEASUREMENT ISSUES TO CONSIDER
The effect of measurement error and noise cannot be
neglected while doing the measurements. Measurement error
could cause a drift from the actual results. Similarly measure-
ment noise can make output response very noisy and affect the
efficiency of post-processing in obtaining a unique response.
We must also take into account the aging of transistors and
noise inside the IC. Below we have highlighted some of the
key measurement issues that have to be taken into account:
1) Measurement has inevitable noises.
2) Electrical devices like Transistors are prone to many
physical variations due to constant. electrical, thermal
stress and noise.
3) Electrical and Thermal stresses cause reliability issues
like HCI and NBTI.
4) During measurement constant electrical stress at high
frequency can cause shift in the output over period
of time of the same IC.
5) This variation over period cannot be ignored during
the measurement and must be taken in account during
post processing.
V. FUTURE WORK
As part of future work we have developed a Printed
Circuit Board (PCB) for the measurement purpose as shown
in Figure 1. For initial measurements we have chosen a FPGA
as IC under test. For the RF input and output connections the
board has SMA connectors. For line impedance matching 50
Ohms resistors are used between SMA connectors and FPGA
pins.
Fig. 1. Proposed hardware model of EM based authentication with a
testbench. This testbench is specifically made to use RF signal as excitation
to the IC.
We attempt to do repeatable measurements on a number
of FPGAs and ASICs in different RF frequency ranges with
different input power levels and observe the output for each
case. From results obtained the required post-processing would
be done to find the unique fingerprint of the IC.
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